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Abstract
Based on the analysis of the Argentinean currency board and the
full dollarization scheme in Ecuador this paper argues that an
intermediate exchange rate regime (compared to free floating or hard
peg)  will be a better option for countries subject to external financial
shocks and a worldwide export and import structure.
It shows that the Argentine convertibility system was successful
as an anti-inflationary program. However, the reduction in the
inflation rate has been accompanied by a dramatic change in relative
prices of tradable and non tradable goods and services, which have
caused serious problems in the international competitiveness of the
economy. The dollarization regime in Ecuador did not lead, as in
Argentina, to a rapid reduction in the inflation rate (in 2001, CPI may
still increase 30%); if inflationary inertia persists for too long,
Ecuador may witness the same deterioration of relative prices between
tradable and non tradable products, negatively affecting its external
sector.
Price stability is not a synonym of economic stability. The
convertibility system generated a paradoxical situation, in which the
economy is very stable when judged by the stability of the general
price level and the exchange rate, but very unstable, if one looks at the
growth rates of the economy. This instability relates to external credit
cycles and changes in export income which directly affect the
monetary base and hence the level domestic credit. Also, the absence
of the adjustment in relative prices between tradables and non-
tradables,  requires  that  in  the  event  of an external deficit, the entire
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burden of adjustment falls on the contraction of the economic activity, since this is the only way to
reduce imports.
Hard-peg regimes heighten the external sector’s influence over the pace of economic
activity, even in a country like Argentina, with low coefficients of trade openness (in 2001, imports
and exports each represented less than 10% of GDP in current values). In Ecuador, trade openness
coefficients are around 30%. Argentina took advantage of the availability of foreign capital that
emerging markets enjoyed beginning in 1991-1992. In the first half of the nineties, the capital
inflows permitted the financing of the current account deficit and significant pace of economic
growth.  Nevertheless, it has resulted in high external indebtedness and rising payments of interest
and capital income, which, in the absence of a sustained rate of export growth, jeopardized the
future viability of the convertibility scheme.
A lesson that arises from the Argentine experience is that it is not possible to sustain in the
long run a hard peg regime together with long lasting fiscal or current account deficits; either fiscal
or current account equilibrium have to be achieved, which as it was seen is not an obvious outcome
of hard peg regimes.  In Argentina, this simultaneous equilibrium was not attained: when the
economy grew, it produced an increase of imports and a trade deficit; when it did not grow, there
was a fall in tax revenues, which led to a fiscal deficit.  Increasingly since the Mexican crisis, the
way to elude this contradiction was the increasing in public external debt. In this sense contrary to
what was suggested, the convertibility system stimulated public external indebtedness instead of
forcing a move towards fiscal discipline.  As a final result, at present Argentina had to face severe
deficits both in the fiscal and external sectors. This implies that in the case of Argentina the
convertibity law was able to eliminate for several years the devaluation risk, but dramatically
increased  the default risk, which has proven to be as costly as the former and led to a strong attack
to convertibility.
 It is also shown that for the Argentinean case the automatic adjustment mechanisms implied
by hard pegs has not operated in a smooth way. This is due to the fact that  international financial
markets tend to adjust via quantity rather than via prices: a rise in interest rates does not lead to an
increase in capital inflows to a country whose over-indebtedness is already manifest, as is the case
of Argentina and Ecuador and they can not rely on a permanent access to the international financial
markets at reasonable interest rates.
Also, external crisis go hand by hand with domestic banking crisis introducing difficulties in
the dynamics of the automatic adjustment. The natural raise in the domestic interest rates to attract
external financing  has a strong effect in deepening domestic recession and  increasing financial
cost. These two factors create solvency and liquidity problems in the corporate level, worsening the
risk of the banking sector liabilities and driving it towards a banking crisis. As long as the exchange
rate regime places limits on the Central Bank to act as a lender of last resort problems of insolvency
can spread more easily to the banking system.
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I. Introduction
As a result of the series of exchange rate crises in emerging
economies, a debate concerning the most suitable exchange rate
regime increased in intensity during the late nineties. It was argued
that “intermediate” exchange rate regimes were no longer sustainable
in such countries, given the growing integration of financial markets
and the instability the latter have shown. According to this view,
countries should choose between free floating and “hard peg” regimes.
Within Latin America, the cases of Argentine “convertibility” (until
December 2001) and the dollarisation in Ecuador were given as
examples of successful hard peg regimes.
Latin American economies have witnessed a wide range of
different exchange rate regimes. In some cases, exchange rate policy
has been used as a tool to enhance competitiveness; while in others, it
has been used as a nominal anchor for stabilization purposes.
According to the different objectives posed to the exchange rate
policies, countries have experienced with active crawling peg systems
(a timetable of pre-announced devaluations), exchange rate bands,
where the exchange rate is allowed to float within a certain margin (it
is possible to allow the band to slide, but not necessarily at the rate of
current inflation), flexible exchange rate with some degree of
intervention, and fixed parity. Sometimes, when a fixed exchange rate
regime has been adopted, additional credibility has been sought
through the passage of laws setting the parity of the currency and the
adoption of very strict monetary rules under which the monetary base
issued by the central bank has to be fully backed by the country’s
international reserves at all times.
From hard-peg to hard landing? Recent experiences of Argentina and Ecuador
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These cases constitute the so-called “hard peg” regimes.  Dollarisation is the most radical
regime within this policy category (Calvo, 2000).
Even though the major reason for implementing a fixed exchange rate regime has been to
control the inflation rate, in many cases this type of regime has also been used as a device to induce
or promote changes in the behaviour of economic agents and institutional reforms. In particular,
when implemented simultaneously with trade liberalization, one of the economic authorities’
objectives has been to impel sectors exposed to external competition to increase their
competitiveness, since it will no longer be possible to protect their market share through
devaluations of the local currency. Moreover, by reducing the flexibility of monetary instruments
and of the exchange rate, it was thought that a greater flexibility in other markets (particularly, in
labour market) and fiscal discipline would be necessarily achieved.
In the last twenty-five years, the decision by some Latin American economies to adopt a
fixed exchange regime was taken in moments when they could profit from a large availability of
international financing. These countries have, for the most part, been successful in reducing
inflation, but not in establishing a regime of sustained growth. Examples of such regimes are the
monetarist experiments of Chile, Argentina and Uruguay in late seventies and early eighties,
Mexican anti-inflationary policy between 1990 and 1994, and the “Real Plan” in Brazil, between
1994 and 1999.
Once the fixed exchange rate was put in place by these countries, the economies tended to
follow a similar macroeconomic pattern, which can be stylised in three distinct phases. In a first
phase, these regimes promoted what seemed to be a “virtuous circle” of foreign capital inflows,
lower inflation, an expansion of domestic credit as the economy remonetises, a recovery of
consumption, an upturn in imports and a rise in fiscal revenues. Economic growth attained high
figures, boosted by the availability of credit, both foreign and domestic, and by the use of idle
capacity of production. In a second phase, the virtuous circle of stabilization and recovery comes to
an end. The brake is usually put on by current account deficits, mainly due to trade imbalances
caused by the real appreciation of the currency. Moreover, that appreciation leads to increase
difficulties in tradable-producing sectors, where employment and production tend to decline, while
both domestic and external debt are on the rise.
In a third phase, external deficit widens, since now the service of the foreign debt and the
payment of profits increase. The level of perceived country risk increases and capital inflows
decreases dramatically, while capital outflows speed up. Interest rates are raised in order to attract
short-term capital and to defend the exchange rate. Expenditure is cut down in order to reduce the
trade deficit; as a consequence, fiscal revenues fall, interest payments over public debt
soar, unemployment rises and bank fragility becomes evident. While output contracts, the
“virtuous circle” of phase-1 reverts into a vicious one. This phase is often accompanied (or
triggered) by external shocks like a rise in external interest rates, the deterioration of the terms of
trade, an international capital’s “flight to safety” provoked by the crisis of another emergent
country, a slower growth in the world economy or a drop in world trade, which, given the economic
disequilibria accumulated, force countries to leave abrupt and traumatically the fixed exchange rate
regime.
Hard-peg regimes aim at introducing qualitative differences with other fixed exchange rate
regimes, by means of tighter legal commitments concerning the exchange rate peg and monetary
emission rules. These differences, according to official views, should prevent previous failures to
occur. Based on the Argentine experience, this paper shows that the three phases process is not
avoided, but may be even accentuated by hard peg rules. During the first phase, legal guarantees
and tougher rules played a decisive role in building credibility on international financial markets,
leading to excessive capital inflows; they afterwards prolonged the second phase, during which
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external and public debts increased steadily, and the conditions for a grave crisis were set up; and
finally, they made it impossible to pilot the economy through the third phase, due to the loss of
policy instruments. In that phase, the strategy to stick to the basic rules of convertibility in the
hope of a renewal of confidence and the achievement of an automatic adjustment only aggravated
the crisis.
The situation could be different to some extent in Ecuador, since initial conditions are not
favourable to a booming first phase. But even if macroeconomic dynamics is not explosive, the
sustainability of these regimes and their capacity to frame a development process is unlikely.
Recent experience suggests that the maintaining of a hard peg system (including dollarisation)
needs conditions, which are very difficult to gather and preserve, such as growing and sustained
inflows of foreign currency. Moreover, countries that choose to implement such regimes should
have their economies mostly based on services rather than on the production of tradable goods, in
order to cope with real appreciation of the exchange rate, and be in a situation that allows them to
live almost completely from external trade and finance. However, Hong Kong and Panama are not
replicable models for almost all other Latin American countries.
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II. Phase-1: price stabilization and
economic recovery
In Argentina, for the sake of credibility, the “convertibility”
plan had to show sharp differences not only with the policies followed
in the near past, but with a previous attempt of using the exchange rate
as a nominal anchor as well; that was the 1978-1981 “active crawling-
peg” experience, which intended to check inflation and enforce liberal
reforms, and led to a serious banking crisis, huge capital outflows and
high external indebtedness; the crisis culminated in the devaluation of
the currency, the nationalization of private external debts and the
acceleration of inflation (Calcagno, 1984). The burden of external debt
over the balance of payments and government finances was overwhelming;
it was one of the main reasons of the process of deterioration that led
to debt default in 1988 and hyperinflation in 1989.
The Act establishing the Convertibility Plan (in March 1991)
fixed the exchange rate at the value of 10,000 australes per dollar,1
and tried to give credibility to this rate in two ways. One was the
rigidity of the measure: the exchange rate was fixed by law, which
could only be changed by another law; the other was the
announcement that the money issued must be backed by the
international reserves: if the public so wished, it was stated, they could
change the entire national currency holdings for dollars. The
possibility of such conversion was ensured (in theory) by the monetary
rule: the Central Bank could only increase the monetary base in
                                                     
1 As from January 1992, the austral was replaced by the peso at the rate of 1 peso = 10,000 australes.
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accordance with a corresponding increase in its monetary reserves.2 Furthermore, another Act
amending the Charter of the Central Bank severely limited its capacity to grant rediscounts and
temporary advances to financial institutions and restricted the possibility of granting finance to the
government. Through these measures, the issuing function of the Central Bank was brought closer
to that of a currency board which would issue or absorb money in line with variations in the foreign
exchange reserves, depriving the Central Bank of its function as lender of last resort.
In Ecuador dollarisation began with the peg of the exchange rate at 25,000 sucres per dollar
(on January 9th 2000) and attained legal status with the adoption of the Law on Economic
Transformation of Ecuador in March of the same year. This law does not formally eliminate the
sucre as national currency (to that purpose a constitutional reform would be required) but makes
circulation of foreign currencies legal, guarantees their transfer out of the country, establishes that
accounting and contracts should be made in dollars, banns the issuance of new sucres by the
Central Bank and withdraws from circulation those that are exchanged for dollars. As a result the
sucres progressively disappeared from the economy of Ecuador, leaving only a tiny amount of
small change, which should be entirely covered by international reserves.
This Act stipulates that the fiscal budget to be submitted to the Parliament may not present a
deficit of more than 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and that real expenditure growth
cannot exceed 5% of that in the previous year. Moreover, the average fiscal balance over three years
must be at least in equilibrium. In case of extraordinary fiscal revenues from the oil activity, a part
of them must go to a Stabilization Fund, designed to finance infrastructure projects and debt repayments.
This law also opens sectors such as hydrocarbons, electricity and telecommunications to
private capital,3 and changes the Labour Code by making it more flexible, in particular by the
introduction of hourly contracts (with a minimum pay of 0.5 dollars per hour). These basic reforms
are presented as necessary requirements for the functioning of the dollarisation: from this point of
view the extension of precarious labour contracts is imperative for obtaining flexibility in an
economy that has lost several instruments for dealing with external shocks, while privatisation
would attract external capital and thereby strengthen the balance of payments.
In Argentina, the convertibility system has been very successful as an anti-inflationary
program: from a four-digit inflation rate before the beginning of the plan (1,344% in 1990), the rate
was lowered to 84% in 1991 (with the major rises being concentrated in the first quarter, before the
start of the program), 18% in 1992, 7.4% in 1993; between 1995 and 2001 it has oscillated between
+1.6 and -1.8%.4
This achievement, however, came together with a dramatic change in relative prices of
tradable and non-tradable goods and services. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the price index of
industrial goods (mostly tradables) related to the price index of services (mostly non-tradables). It
can be noted that the authorities pegged the exchange rate after a year during which the local
currency had been overvalued, with the consequent deterioration of the relative prices of industrial
goods. Since the establishment, along with the convertibility system, of a fixed exchange rate, the
momentum of services prices continued having an adverse impact on the relative prices of
industrial goods until this relationship stabilized in 1994.
                                                     
2 Among the international reserves computed as backing for the monetary base the Government included dollar-denominated
Argentine public securities in the hands of the Central Bank, valued at their market price. Strictly speaking, these securities should
not be considered as a component of international reserves, since they are not foreign claims. The special nature of this component
was implicitly recognized because it was laid down that they could not account for more than 20% of total reserves —that limit was
afterwards increased to 33%. In fact, as a part of the monetary base could be backed by these securities, the Central Bank was given
some (limited) flexibility in monetary emission, which would prove to be of great importance to cope with 1995 crisis.
3 The private sector could absorb up to 51% of the shares in the telecommunications and electricity firms.
4 These values correspond to the December-December variation in the consumer price index (ECLAC, on the basis of official figures).
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The stabilization of the price level, together with the inflow of foreign capital, had a major
effect on the economic recovery that took place between 1991 and 1994. These factors permitted a
rapid remonetisation of the economy and an expansion of credit (especially consumer credit),
which gave way to a reactivation that was mainly based on the use of idle capacity (table 1). Fiscal
accounts improved for several reasons: the lower real cost of the public debt in dollars; the
diminished inflationary erosion of fiscal revenues (the Olivera-Tanzi effect in reverse); and a wider
tax base, due to the increase in both activity and imports. These new conditions, combined
with the improved operation of the tax system, paved the way for a rise in fiscal revenues and a
considerable reduction in the fiscal deficit, even though public expenditure also increased.
Figure 1
ARGENTINA:  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
PRICE INDICES FOR INDUSTRIAL GOODS AND SERVICES PRICES, 1987-2000
(Indexes, first quarter of 1991 = 100)
Source:  ECLAC Office in Buenos Aires, on the basis of official figures.
Memo:  Industrial prices are measured by the national non-agricultural Wholesale Price Index (WPI)
after excluding derivatives of goods typically from the Argentine pampa from that index. The
services prices used are components of the consumer price index (CPI).
Table 1
ARGENTINA: AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH OF GROSS
DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP), IMPORTS AND EXPORTS BETWEEN 1990 AND 2000
(On the basis of constant 1995 dollars)
1991-1994 1995-1998 1999-2001
Gross domestic product (GDP) 8.0 3.6 -2.8
Imports 54.3 12.8 -10.9
Exports 2.9 15.4 1.3
Source:  ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
Ready access to foreign capital was a very important factor in the economy’s performance.
The launch of the convertibility plan coincided with the return of foreign capital inflows to Latin
America.5 The access to external financing was made easier by an early re-negotiation of external
debt obligations, within the terms of the Brady Plan.
                                                     
5 Between 1982 and 1990, Latin America registered a negative net transfer of resources amounting, on average, to US$ 24.4 billion
each year. From 1991 on, these transfers became positive: between 1992 and 1998, they amounted to US$ 24.2 billion, on average,
annually. In 1999 and 2000, they were once again negative, but the shortfall was much smaller in size than before (ECLAC, 2000).
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Regarding prices, the establishment of a fixed exchange rate in Ecuador did not lead, as it did
in Argentina, to rapid disinflation. On the contrary, inflation accelerated during 2000, when the
consumer price index (CPI) showed a cumulative increase of 91% from December to December,
compared to an increase of 61% in 1999 and of 43% in 1998. However, during 2001, inflation
decelerated to 22.4%, and an inflation rate of around 10% (accumulated to December) is expected
for 2002.6
The contrast between the rapid deceleration of inflation in Argentina after the exchange rate
was pegged, and the continuous inflation in Ecuador, must be considered in the context of different
initial conditions. In fact, the starting point of each case is clearly different: the exchange rate of
25,000 sucres to the dollar was established following a very steep devaluation, rather than
following a year during which the rate of inflation was systematically higher than the rate of
devaluation (as in the case of Argentina in 1990). Between January 1999 and January 2000, the
sucre devaluated by 244.4%; inflation measured by CPI was 78.1%, but producer prices of goods
(PPI) increased 268.8%. Between January 2000 and January 2002, CPI grew 108.2%, and PPI only
18.1%. With these figures, consumer prices inertia can still be seen as a lagged adjustment to the
rise of producer’s prices.
Ecuador embarked on the dollarisation of its economy under domestic and international
conditions that make access to external credit difficult, but started the process with a comfortable
level of foreign currency due to high international oil prices and a wide current account surplus,
which reflected a very low level of imports. First, capital supply for emerging markets is far more
limited than in the early nineties; second, Ecuador faces particular constraints, given the high level
of its existing external debt and the fact that it already had to restructure its maturities. Ecuador
will also have to face important amounts of payments related to its external debt, even if it obtained
a reduction on the amount of the face value. External debt is still very important, around US$ 13.5
billion. Even though the relation between external debt and GDP has decreased from 99.7% in
2000 to 75.5% in 2001, due to the increase of GDP measured in current dollars, it is still in a high
level (237% of exports).
Ecuador is committed to gradually purchase its own Global Bonds in the secondary market;
interests on those bonds will progressively rise from 4% to 10% in 2006; and if Ecuador incurs in
arrears or does not buy its bonds as scheduled, it will lose some of the nominal reduction of the
debt. As a result, the doubts about Ecuador’s capacity to face debt payments have not disappeared,
making unlikely a renewed access to international capital markets.
During the last two years, (the first two years of the dollarisation regime) both overall GDP
and GDP per capita grew at rates not seen in Ecuador in several years. Most of this growth
represented a recovery from the strong recession of 1999 and has been sustained principally by the
investment in the Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados (OCP) (an oil pipeline), and some recovery in the
private consumption levels. This however, has reflected in the rise of imports during 2000 and 2001 —
imports of goods raised 24.5% in 2000 and 45.1% during 2001. In 2001, trade balance became once
again negative (exports fell 6.8% during the year) and, despite the rise in the value of migrant’s
transfers, current account became negative again and amounted to -3.2% of GDP.
                                                     
6 Even though inflation rate has decelerated from the figures of last years, it has not converged to US levels. That convergence could
be further delayed considering that subsidies on consumer goods and services have not been eliminated, and the prices of fuel, gas
and some public services have not been yet raised up to international levels.
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Table 2
ECUADOR: AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH OF GROSS DOMESTIC
PRODUCT (GDP), IMPORTS AND EXPORTS BETWEEN 1990 AND 2001 (PROJECTED)
(On the basis of 1995 dollars)
1991-1994 1995-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001
Gross domestic product (GDP) 3.6 3.1 -4.2 4.1
Imports 13.7 10.6 -15.5 28.5
Exports 12.2 7.4 -4.1 -0.9
Source:  ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
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III. Phase-2: mounting disequilibria
In Argentina, the convertibility regime proved to be an eager
consumer of foreign currency. It started, it is true, with a very low
level of imports, but external purchases then began to increase at a
much faster rate than exports during the first years, thus turning a large
surplus on the merchandise trade balance in 1990 (US$ 8.0 billion)
into a deficit of almost the same size in 1994 (US$ 7.8 billion).
Current account deficit reached US$11 billion in 1994. During the
recovery phase, the bulk of foreign financing flew to the private
sector, mainly in the form of short-term capital, placement of bonds,
portfolio investment and foreign direct investment (FDI). Between
1992 and 1994, only 27% of total net capital inflows came from
public-sector operations (essentially privatisations).
According to official assertions, these imbalances were not
worrisome. It was stated that reforms and privatisations under course
would generate such sizeable productivity gains that the initial
imbalances on the current account of the balance of payments would
soon disappear, thanks to a rapid increase in exports and to the greater
competitiveness of tradable sectors in general. All this, without the
need to modify the exchange rate. In fact, imbalance in the current
account has proven very difficult to reduce, since remittance of
utilities and interest payments rose in step with the increase in external
debt and in FDI during the 1990s (chiefly as a result of the acquisition
of public and private firms by foreign investors). Dependency from
capital inflows remained at similar levels during the following phases,
even when recession had already led to trade surplus.
From hard-peg to hard landing? Recent experiences of Argentina and Ecuador
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Mexican crisis of 1994-1995 marked the end of the recovery phase. Argentina was the most
affected country in Latin America by Mexican “contagion”, given the overvaluation of its currency
and the growing external imbalance. During the first months of 1995, there were massive deposit
withdrawals from banks and a severe loss of international reserves. This triggered a “crucial
experience” concerning the alleged automatic mechanisms of Convertibility. According to such
mechanisms, the loss of reserves would reduce monetary base, and hence the liquidity of the
banking system; credit would then contract, and economic activity would decline. The weaker
demand for imports, on the one hand, and the inflow of foreign capital attracted by higher interest
rates, on the other, would eventually put the balance of payments back into equilibrium, and a
recovery could begin. This link between the balance of payments and liquidity would thus entail a
tendency to form economic cycles, but it would also bring an automatic mechanism of adjustment
into being.
Reality stood far from those conceptual mechanisms. In theory, the monetary base should
have contracted to the same amount than the reserves; it did not. Between November 1994 and May
1995, the decline in international reserves (-2,706 billion pesos), was substantially greater than the
contraction in the monetary base (-886 million pesos).7 At the same time, the outflow of deposits
from the banking system was much more important than the reduction of credit balances. Demand
deposits decreased relatively little (-482 million pesos, representing a reduction of 4.4% of such
deposits), but time deposits fell much more sharply (by 26.6% in the case of peso deposits and
12.5% in that of dollar deposits), for a total of nearly 6.5 billion pesos. As can be seen, the pressure
on international reserves came from time deposits, which fell sharply, rather than from M1 or the
monetary base. This point is conceptually important, since the commitment to the convertibility
system, according to which the value of the monetary base may not exceed that of international
reserves, it does not mean that all the money that could be exchanged for dollars (that is, M3, not
the monetary base) is “backed” by those reserves.
Concerning credits, the automatic adjustment would have led to a process of debt deflation.
It didn’t occur either. In spite of the reduction of deposits, which amounted to 7 billion pesos, the
global balance of credit to the private sector only went down by 320 million pesos. As a
consequence, financial institutions were confronted to a severe liquidity problem. In order to cope
with the reduction of deposits, they had to make use of their cash balances and reserves, both in the
Central Bank and abroad; this was far from sufficient to meet the demand for the return of deposits,
although it was excessive with respect to their obligation to maintain minimum legal reserve
requirements. In fact, a large scale rescue was necessary to avoid a banking collapse, with the
Central Bank reducing the requirement of bank reserves and reassuming the role of lender of last
resort: by May 1995 the financial system had received nearly 3.5 billion pesos from the Central
Bank in rediscounts and swaps.8
This monetary supply took full advantage of the margin left by the Convertibility Act to
“back” part of the monetary base with Argentine public bonds instead of true reserves, but would
have led Convertibility to its end without the access to fresh foreign capital. But now, the main
recipient was no longer the private, but the public sector. During the last three quarters of 1995,
both the Central Bank and the national government increased their external indebtedness, by a total
of US$ 8.3 billion. This amount may be compared with the recovery of the Central Bank’s
international reserves, which rose from some US$ 10 billion at the end of March 1995 to almost
US$ 16 billion at the end of December.
                                                     
7 The loss of reserves was the most intense between the end of December and the end of March: it amounted to -5.8 billion dollars, or
36.3% of the balance as of the end of 1994. In April 1995, Argentina began to receive external financial assistance from multilateral
agencies (1.9 billion dollars).
8 For a more detailed presentation of the 1995 Argentine bank crisis and the role of the Central Bank, see Calcagno, 1997.
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The crisis of 1995 was a turning point in the access to foreign financing, and from this point
of view, a critical element in the passage to phase-2. Financial requirements remained roughly at
the same level, even though the average growth rate of GDP fell abruptly, and in spite of an
increase in exports: during this phase, overvalued currency had a greater effect in increasing
imports than in hindering exports, most of which are intensive in natural resources or benefited
from Mercosur agreement and from Brazilian expansion. Also, the composition of that financing
changed radically. Total capital flows to private sector fell sharply, and net flows of short-term
capital became strongly negative (see table 3).9
Table 3
ARGENTINA: FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOWS, 1992-2001
(Annual averages)
1992-1994 1995-1997 1998-2001 1992-1994 1995-1997 1998-2001
Billion dollars Percentages
Capital flows to the public sector 3.2 8.5 9.4 27.1 70.2 79.7
Privatisations 2.3 0.9 1.2 19.5 7.4 10.2
Foreign loans 0.9 7.6 8.2 7.6 62.8 69.5
Capital flows to the private sector 8.6 3.6 2.4 72.9 29.8 20.3
Foreign loans to financial sector
(excl. Central Bank) 1.1 -0.1 1.1 9.3 -0.8 9.3
Foreign loans to non financial sector 3.3 5.1 1.5 28.0 42.1 12.7
Other capital movements 1.1 -6.5 -6.4 9.3 -53.7 -54.2
FDI & portfolio investment 3.1 5.1 6.2 26.3 42.1 52.5
Total 11.8 12.1 11.8 100 100 100
Source:  On the basis of Secretary of Economic and Regional Programming, Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Public Works and Services, Informe Económico (several issues) and Estimaciones Trimestrales del Balance de
Pagos y Activos y Pasivos Externos (several issues).
Other types of capital continued entering the country as flows to the private sector, mainly in
the form of net placements of private debt bonds (this source was especially significant in 1997, but
it began to decline in 1998 and became negative in 2000), and FDI, which corresponded mostly to
the purchase of Argentine banks and other companies by foreign investors. However, in this second
phase, it was the public sector that provided 70% of total external financing, and it did so by
placing external debt (there was little left to privatise). The total external debt balance jumped from
US$ 59 billion in 1991 to US$ 147 billion in 2000, with 60% of this figure corresponding to the
public sector.10
These developments were not innocuous for fiscal balances: interest payments went up
steadily, absorbing an increasing share of public receipts. At the same time, a far-reaching reform
of the social security system was launched, which intended to replace the distribution public system
with a capitalization private one. As a result, a significant part of contributions were transferred
from the public system to private financial institutions, without any reduction in pension and
retirement payments by the public sector. A third factor in the deterioration of fiscal accounts is the
lower average growth rate during this phase, which affected tax revenues, while capital income
(through privatisations) naturally diminished, for the State had hastily sold its public firms during
phase-1.
                                                     
9 The figures of table 3 do not include the “errors and omissions” of the balance of payments (presumably short-term private capital
flows), which amounted, on average, -0.8 billion dollars per year during 1992-1994 and -1.1 billion in the period 1995-2000.
10 See República Argentina, Ministerio de Economía, Estimaciones Trimestrales del Balance de Pagos y de Activos y Pasivos
Externos, several issues.  According to other sources, the 2000 total debt amounts to 152.1 billion dollars (J.P.Morgan, 2001).
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Summing up, since 1995, convertibility has been maintained essentially thanks to increased
external borrowing by the public sector. The high level of liabilities with foreign agents (external
debt as well as FDI and portfolio investment) has generated a structural deficit on the balance of
investment income, which has been as high as 40% of exports. Moreover, if payments on the debt
principal were added, the amount would exceed total exports. Simultaneously, fiscal balance
deteriorated, not only as a consequence of the end of phase-1 recovery and privatisations, but
mainly as a result of growing public indebtedness and of the “market friendly” reform of the social
security system. External and fiscal imbalances, thus intimately related together, were to play a
central role in the dynamics of phase-3: the crisis.
In the case of Ecuador, dollarisation was adopted shortly after a default on its external debt,
with no access to the international financial markets. This poses a restraint to finance relatively
large imbalances, fiscal or external, with additional debt. Therefore, the maintenance of the
dollarisation depends on the inflow of foreign currency from exports, FDI or loans from
multilateral organizations. In order to do so, economic authorities are negotiating a deal with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), are trying to impulse fiscal reforms (the end of subsidies to
fuels and gas, and a raise in VAT tax) and are putting their hopes on a new oil pipeline that is being
built and that will allow the increase in the exported volumes of crude oil.
Regarding the fiscal sector, its revenue depends largely (around a third) on the export
revenues of oil, and therefore, on the international price of crude oil. In 2001, government
presented a small surplus on its fiscal accounts mainly achieved thanks to the growth of the
economic activity and to the raise in the nominal values of the GDP, principally due to inflation. In
the other hand, fiscal expenditures were not fully indexed to prices. Thus, if considered in real
terms (after deflating with CPI), central government expenditures went down by 21.2% while its
revenues only decreased 9.1%; this reduction is explained by decreasing oil revenues, non entirely
offset by the rise of non-oil receipts.
The government needs to diversity its sources of fiscal revenues in order not to depend so
much on oil. A fiscal reform under the agreements made with IMF is under way, but most of the
reform aims at raising VAT tax and eliminating subsidies to fuels and cooking gas. Both proposals
are strongly rejected by some sectors of the population; this could postpone the reform, at least
until the general election of October 2002. Economic authorities also need to face the remaining
costs of bailing out the financial system. In 2002, even though oil prices have remained quite above
the price forecasted by the government at the beginning of the year, they still remain lower, on
average, than those of 2001. In this sense, Ecuador will probably face difficulties in meeting the
targets established with the IMF and will have probably to cut public expenses.11 Ecuador faces
during 2002 payments on external debt for US$ 854 million (Reuters, 2002), and an agreement
with IMF would help to open the door for loans from other multilateral institutions.
Considering prices, inflation rate in Ecuador fell significantly from the 2000 rate. However,
it was still at a 22.4% (accumulated to December), still high in a fixed exchange rate scheme.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of prices of different sectors in comparison with general CPI, since
July 1999. It seems useful to distinguish two periods in inflation dynamics: between mid-1999 and
mid-2000, and from mid-2000 on. During the first period, inflation is still very high (its monthly
average is 6.2%), especially in the case of food, beverages and tobacco; clothing and footwear;
miscellaneous goods and services; furniture, household maintenance and equipment; and health
care services. Therefore, among the “winners” (those sectors where prices increased faster than the
general consumer price index) we find a sizeable number of presumably tradable goods, but also
                                                     
11 In late March 2002, the government revised its estimation of Ecuadorian oil price to US$ 17 per barrel, and decided a reduction of
US$ 500 million in its expenditure. However, the evolution of the oil price has been favourable with an average price for the
Ecuadorian crude of almost U$S 23 per barrel as of September 2002.
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some services. Conversely, the sectors that appear to have lost ground during the same period are
education; rental payments, water, electricity, gas and other fuels; hotels and restaurants; and
transportation. This is, mainly non-tradable services, and/or sectors with administered prices and
whose readjustments have lagged behind global inflation.
Since mid-2000, with a much lower rate of inflation (2.0% per month in average) “winners”
generally became “losers”, and vice-versa. One explanation would be that the devaluations of 1999
had a favourable effect on tradable goods and an unfavourable one on some non-tradable sectors
but that these effects were far from instantaneous and lasted for about a year, thereby prolonging
inflation (particularly in the case of tradable goods) far beyond the point in time when the exchange
rate was pegged. This is an important difference with respect to the situation in Argentina, where
all the remaining inflationary inertia after the parity rate was established, was reflected in the prices
of services. From the second half of 2000 to mid-2002, it can be seen that the relative prices of
goods are tending to decline while the relative prices of services are tending to rebound
(transportation, education, hotels and restaurants, as well as rent, water, electricity and other fuel).
If this trend remains in evidence over time, that is, if “inflationary inertia” in services not exposed
to external competition should persist, then Ecuador may witness the deterioration in the relative
prices of goods which has been a characteristic of all Latin American experiences with the use of
exchange-rate anchors. Such a configuration of relative prices could generate problems in the
external sector, even though many exports are not very sensitive to the real exchange rate.
Figure 2
TRENDS IN THE VARIOUS CONSUMER PRICE
INDEX (CPI) COMPONENTS IN RELATION TO THE GENERAL CPI
(January 2000 = 100)
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Source:  On the basis of Central Bank of Ecuador (BCE), Boletín Estadístico Mensual, several issues.
The evolution of interest rates shows that referential interest rates fell from 13.6% in
February 2000, to 5.2% in February 2002. Interest rates for loans with a term shorter than a month
shows a decrease in the same magnitude as referential rates —from 17.7% in January 2000, to
8.0% in December 2001; however, for loans with higher maturities interest rates have stayed more
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or less on the same levels (around 13% and 14%) and interest rates for loans to other debtors than
corporations with maturities over a month actually raised (from around 17% to around 20%).
Regarding deposit rates, short-term deposit rates tend to show a slight decrease while deposit rates
over a year tend to show a slight increase. This means that banks expect that long-term interest
rates will, at least, not decrease.
Domestic credit to the private sector, in nominal values, increased from U$S 3,589 million in
December 1999 to U$S 4,422 million in January 2002, but decreased in almost 50% in real terms
(that is, at dollars of December 1999), with real GDP growing 7.9% in the same period. Since there
is not longer a lender of last resort and banks still perceive the risks that affected the banking
system recently, private banks tend to be very conservative at the time of awarding credit and
prefer to stay liquid.12
At the moment, the country’s main source of foreign currency is the inflow of foreign direct
investment related to the construction of the new oil pipeline. This should entry in operation in
mid-2003 and economic authorities expect that the increased volume of oil exported together with a
recovery of primary exports such as bananas and shrimps will provide the necessary inflow of
foreign currency to sustain convertibility in the short-term. However, the expected recovery of the
consumption levels and the change in relative prices towards imported goods will put pressure on
the commercial account. Therefore it is important to define under what conditions it will be
feasible to maintain a surplus of foreign currency over the long run, taking into account the high
level of the interest payments that are already scheduled.13 Transfers from immigrant workers have
been gaining importance. Non-oil exports showed a moderate growth of 8.4% in 2001, but the
economic situation of Ecuador’s major trading partners for this type of goods, basically its
neighbours, will limit their growth in 2002. On the other hand, the lower price expected for oil
exports together with a positive growth on imports will make a deficit in the trade account more
likely in 2002. Such a trend could not be sustained much longer, if Ecuador is to avoid the phase-3,
which Argentina is experiencing.
                                                     
 12 “Something that is worrisome is that there is not, until now, a clear relation with the fall in interest rates, the fall in inflation and the
recovery of credit. Specifically, in the months where referential interest rates have fallen, a rise in the credit did not occur. We have
to find, together with the financial sector, the way to channel that liquidity to the productive sector”. Carlos Julio Emanuel, Minister
of Economy, El Comercio, December 31, 2001.
13 Experience points to the necessity, in the long term, of developing exports of goods and services, since capital inflows that can be
obtained through FDI or portfolio investment tend to generate a structural deficit on the investment revenue balance.
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IV. Phase-3: crisis strikes
It is not easy to define the precise moment when crisis stroke in
Argentina. If we look at the real outcome, we could point out 1999 as
the beginning of depression. If we look primarily to the financial
dynamics that led to the collapse of convertibility, we should prefer a
later date: the end of 2000 or the beginning of 2001.
The debate concerning the sustainability of convertibility has
now been replaced by another one, no less intense, concerning the
causes of its collapse: should we blame external shocks and policy
mistakes, rather than factors intrinsic to the “model”? This discussion
is influenced by the occurrence of several crises during the nineties, in
Latin America as well as in other emergent countries. In those crisis,
financial issues played a key role in the running up and unfolding of
economic crisis. In this context, the dynamics of crisis are triggered by
a change in expectations causing a process of capital flight and
balance sheet collapse, one that is very hard to stop once it starts
(Krugman, 2001, and Dornbusch, 2001).
Risk perception of an economy can change due to factors that
are exogenous to the country itself (contagion phenomena, heard
behaviour of investors, etc). However, there are very important
variables that are the result of domestic policy and strongly influence
the mood of foreign investors. Currency and maturity mismatch
between liabilities and assets, together with exchange rate
misalignments can imply very bad news for foreign investors
expectations. Also significant current account deficits, and
unsatisfactory growth rates do not give good economic signals, and put
pressure in the exchange markets (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000).
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Even though macroeconomic policies in emerging economies are constrained by financial
integration, countries still have some room to try different policy mix related to exchange rate
regimes, monetary and fiscal policies, and capital account opening. The experience of Asian
countries, as well as that of Latin American economies, shows that the way countries have been
affected by financial turmoil and the velocity of their recovery are highly correlated with domestic
policy and the magnitude of accumulated disequilibria before the crisis.
In this sense, Argentina’s current crisis (phase three) can not be understood only as a
problem of change in the direction of capital flows due to a change in foreign investors risk
perception, but as the accumulation of important and deep disequilibria generated during what we
called phase one and two of the convertibility scheme.
In spite of the above, the official interpretation of the 1995 crisis was that the convertibility
system had proven to be impregnable, and that only some complementary measures were required
in order to strengthen the capacity of the financial system to cope with a new episode of deposit
withdrawals and loss of reserves. With this aim, the Central Bank encouraged the de-
nationalization of local banks: it was thought that a foreign bank would be less vulnerable to public
mistrust, and that if necessary, it could count with the support of its central office. As a result, in a
very short period of time, the participation of foreign banks in Argentine financial system
(measured by the share in total deposits) passed from 16% in the verge of 1995 crisis to 48% in
2000. Moreover, Argentina obtained the commitment from a group of 13 international banks for a
credit up to US$ 6.1 billion, which would be available “if there was generalized lack of confidence
in the Argentine financial system or if the system required additional international liquidity over
and above the funds already at the disposal of the banks”.14  Finally, a new system of bank reserves
was implemented, according to which banks had to build up “liquidity requirements”, mainly in the
form of liquid deposits in foreign banks, up to 15% of their total deposits. As a result, it was
thought that Argentina had no longer need of an official lender of last resort, and that the financial
system was ready to cope with a capital flight even stronger than that of 1995. This would have
completed the automatic adjustment mechanism.
Net capital flows to Latin America recovered rapidly after the 1995 low levels (US$ 25
billion), and reached its historical record in 1997 (US$ 83 billion). Argentina was one of the most
important destinations of such funds, due to the issuance of public debt and to the acquisition of
local private firms and banks by foreign investors. Argentine GDP recovered sharply from 1995
recession, showing once again the high correlation between the net transfer of resources and the
rate of growth (figure 3). When Asian crisis and, more important, Russian default took place, net
transfer of resources to Argentina (as to the whole region) diminished, while remaining positive;
this was enough to put a break in economic activity. Brazilian devaluation in January 1999 made
evident how much the exchange rate policy had hampered the competitiveness of Argentine
industry, as a growing number of firms emigrated to the big Mercosur partner. Since the second
half of 1998, Argentina’s GDP has been contracting.
The crisis in Argentina was then explained in very different ways, as it still happens now.
The basic interpretations were clearly stated by Arturo O’Connell, 2000:
“As to the prolonged recession, an ongoing debate was under way at the beginning of this
year (2000) as to the character and best instruments to overcome the recession in Argentina.
On one side stood those that placed all the blame of the recession on the foreign investors’
mistrust arising out of the figures for fiscal deficit. On the other side a less influential sector
of opinion held that it was external deficit that stood on the way of a recovery as the
accumulation of external debt and the exhaustion of the privatisation process had made it
                                                     
14 Statements by Roque Fernández, Ministre of the Economy, on 20 December 1996 (Reuters).
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increasingly difficult to finance further imbalances on current account. The new elected
government, that took place in December 1999, chose the first line of action.”
Figure 3
ARGENTINA: PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP)
GROWTH, NET CAPITAL FLOWS AND NET RESOURCE TRANSFERS, 1990-2001
(Growth rates and millions of dollars)
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Source:  ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
Since 1998, a great deal of efforts have been made in trying to demonstrate the differences
among Argentine convertibility and other experiences of fixed exchange rate regimes, which were
failing one after the other. The abandonment of the convertibility regime was banned from
respectable debate. According to the government (both of Menem and De la Rúa) and to its
successive economic teams, it was, literally, “unthinkable” to exit convertibility. On one hand, it
was alleged, such step would be very costly, considering the large amount of contracts and
liabilities stated in US dollars (dollar-denominated assets held by residents were hardly ever
considered in such analysis). On the other hand, convertibility could resist any attack, thanks to the
“full backing of money with international reserves” and the robustness of the banking system.
Thus, the specific rules of convertibility were put forward to prove that “Argentina is not …”
(subsequently, Thailand, Korea, Russia, Brazil and Turkey), and could face any contingency
without changing that system.
By considering that convertibility was unthinkable, and exiting from it unthinkable, then the
economic policy was aimed at recovering the element that had made it possible to grow and to cope
simultaneously with the external imbalances which stem from that growth: huge capital inflows. It
was, in this view, critical to recover the trust of foreign investors. To reach the “investment grade”
in the qualification of risk agencies became an official target, and a sort of pro-financial sector
demagogy began to guide government actions: almost everything that was believed to have the
approval of potential financial investors was then considered a reactivating measure, even if it
hampered local demand. And ranking first in such a list, was fiscal adjustment.
As it was already stated, fiscal balances passed from equilibrium in the first phase to deficit
since 1995. That deficit, however, was rather low until 2000 (1.3% of GDP in average for the
Public National non-Financial Sector).15 In 2000 and 2001, it increased to 2.4% and 3.5% of GDP,
                                                     
15 This is an intermediate concept, between Central and General Government, for it includes all the Central Government, the Public
Social Security and remaining Public Firms, and approximately 50% or 60% of Local Government (provincias) budget.
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respectively (and one supplementary point of GDP if we include total local governments’
accounts). That deficit was not mainly due to a reckless populist expenditure, as it is frequently
said, following the dismissing of Minister Cavallo in June 1996. In fact, if one excludes interest
payments from current expenditure, the latter was almost stagnant between 1996 and 2000, while
interest payments rose 67% in 4 years. In other terms, the increase in interest payments explains
85% of total increase of current fiscal expenditure between 1996 and 2000. As a result, the burden
of interest payments (essentially from external debt) passed from 6.3% of current income in 1994
to 17.3% in 2000 and 18.9% in 2001. On the income side of fiscal accounts, two factors showed a
substantial deterioration: contributions to the social security system fell markedly after 1994 (since
the State transferred an important amount of them to the new private system), and VAT receipts
were directly affected by economic depression since the mid-1998.
Even if there has been during the period under consideration evident misuses of public
resources, it seems that the bulk of fiscal problems are related to intrinsic problems of the economic
model put in place during the nineties. Social security reform was an important factor. Another one,
which became apparent since phase-2, is the practical impossibility to achieve simultaneously,
within convertibility, both fiscal and current account equilibria. When the economy grows, as in
phase-1 and 2, it produces a sharp increase of imports and a trade deficit; when it does not grow, it
produces a fall in tax revenues, which leads to a fiscal deficit. Since the Mexican crisis, the way to
elude this contradiction was the increasing of public external debt. Contrary to what was suggested,
the convertibility system stimulated public external indebtedness instead of forcing a move towards
fiscal discipline. As a final result, Argentina had to face in phase-3 severe deficits both in the fiscal
and external sectors, with an unbearable burden of debt services.
Efforts made to curb the fiscal deficit through the adjustment of expenses failed. In
December 1999 and May 2000, tax packages were passed by Congress and two basic rounds of cuts
in fiscal expenditure were introduced. Business and families reacted to the fiscal crunch with a
visible cut on expenditure. As a result, a pick-up in economic activity that was proceeding at quite a
fast pace in the second half of 1999, was aborted (O’Connell, 2000). The government changed
twice its economic team in 2001, but insisted with the same policy. In March 2001, after a failed
attempt by the new Minister López Murphy to impose heavy cuts in public expenditures (some of
which were hard to explain, like those in education), Dr. Cavallo reassumed as Minister of
Economy. As he was identified with the achievements of the phase-1, he was viewed as a kind of
“economist of last resort”, and thus reassumed with an impressive political support. Even if both
his reputation and political support weakened dramatically until his dismissal nine months later, he
was able to make the President and the Parliament approve every plan or measure he submitted to
them.
Cavallo admitted openly that there was a problem of overvaluation of the peso, and that some
active policies were necessary for a recovery to begin. There was more than a nuance between
those statements and his previous assertions, in which he considered that the gains in productivity
achieved with his reforms actually offset the “exchange rate gap”.16 This meant also the
abandonment of the strategy of correcting relative prices through deflation; such a strategy was
failing since price deflation was entirely due to the reduction of tradable goods prices. In fact, that
trend only changed when devaluation took place (see figure 4).
He thus modified the exchange rate rule, by introducing the euro, along with the dollar, in
the definition of the exchange rate for imports and exports; this meant a devaluation —for the
foreign trade only— of 8% at that time. A supplementary trade protection was provided by an
                                                     
16 He even considered that, thanks to those gains in productivity, a future exit from convertibility with a floating peso could lead to its
appreciation vis-à-vis the dollar (Cavallo, 2001).
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increase in some import tariffs up to the maximum allowed by WTO agreements, while tariffs on
imported capital goods were eliminated.
Another measure aimed at improving the situation of producers on some economic sectors
was the implementation of “competitiveness plans”. They consisted basically in an intricate system
of tax reductions, in exchange of a commitment by the favoured firms to avoid the dismissal of
workers and of a vague engagement to increase productivity. These measures involved a fiscal cost,
not only by loosing some tax income, but also by disorganizing the tax collection system. These
measures were not the fruit of improvisation: Cavallo had already presented them in October 2000,
as a part of his party’s economic plan, and he believed in the soundness of eliminating some
“distorting” taxes. But simultaneously, in view of the mounting fiscal deficit, he passed an Act,
which established a new tax over bank transactions.
Figure 4
ARGENTINA: TRENDS IN PRICES OF GOODS AND SERVICES AS MEASURED BY
THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (CPI) AND IN PRICES OF MANUFACTURES MEASURED
BY THE WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX (WPI), JANUARY 1998 THROUGH FEBRUARY 2002
(Indexes, March 1998 = 100)
Source:  National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), Argentina.
All these measures proved to be ineffective in order to reverse the recessive tides. They did
not incentive firms to hire new workers or to develop investment, while idle productive capacity
was high and domestic demand was lacking. Regarding the exchange rate reform, it introduced a
marginal improvement in the real exchange rate, while it broke the dogma that stated “one peso is
one dollar”. In any case, the government had to cope with a rapidly deteriorating external situation,
and could not count in its predicament on the expected results of an hypothetical revival of
competitiveness.
Argentina was in the impossibility of servicing its external debt without a permanent inflow
of capital since at least the beginning of phase-2 but, as usual, financial crisis do not break out as
long as the debtor can service its debts with new credits. The solvency problem of Argentina
became evident when its access to the voluntary credit markets was dramatically reduced. In
December 2000, a financial aid of almost 40 billion dollars for the next two years was announced,
and the threaten of a default seemed to have been eliminated. However, only a part of that package
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consisted in disposable funds (the remainder was just commitments of a future renewal of credits
coming to maturity), and it became soon clear that it would not be enough to service the debt and to
face increasing capital outflows. Henceforth, Minister Cavallo arranged in June 2001 a partial re-
scheduling of the external debt in order to obtain larger maturities, though at higher spreads. None
of these measures improved the situation of the external sector, confronted with successive waves
of capital outflows. As in the 1995 crisis, capital outflows were originated in the withdrawals of
time deposits from banks. In February, July-August and November, important runs on deposits took
place (see figure 5); “good news” as the return of Cavallo in March and an extraordinary IMF
credit of US$ 8 billion in September stopped temporarily the loss of deposits, but did not revert the
process.
Figure 5
TOTAL DEPOSITS AND LOANS OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN 2001, DAILY VALUES
(Millions of pesos)
Source:  On the basis of Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, Boletín Estadístico, several issues.
One of the most radical steps in order to restore investor’s confidence was the “Zero Deficit”
law of July 2001. It stipulated that, among its due current expenses, the State had to pay in priority
the interests of its debt, and to reduce —if necessary— all the other payments in the proportion
needed to adjust total expenses to total fiscal revenues. As a result, all pensions, salaries and other
payments were lowered by 13% (only lower salaries and pensions were excluded from the
reduction).
The idea of eliminating the fiscal deficit by reducing the expenses to the level of receipts
rested on a static view of the economic situation. It is a remarkable example of the wrong use of the
ceteris paribus clause, since it didn’t consider the consequences of further cuts in fiscal
expenditure on GDP and on fiscal revenues. As a consequence, the “Zero Deficit” fiscal policy led
to the deepening of the economic recession, to a severe undermining of social and political
situation (the governing alliance was badly beaten in a legislative election in October) and to a
further widening of fiscal deficit (figure 6).
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Figure 6
CURRENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE OF THE
NATIONAL NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR, 1994-2001
(Quarterly, millions of pesos)
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The spectre of debt default haunted the financial markets again; Argentine “country risk”
measured by J. P. Morgan’s EMBI+ indicator soared to more than 4,000 basis points (compared to
an average of 706 basis points in February 2001). The government then put heavy pressure on the
financial system in order to accomplish a second debt restructuring. Banks and private pension
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funds were invited to exchange their public debt bonds (which yielded in average an interest of
12% or 13% but whose market value was under 30% of face value) against credits yielding 7%.
The swap was accepted by the banks since the credits were free of income taxes over interests (in
fact, the swap provided little gains to the State), and avoided the recognition of heavy losses in
banks balance sheets due to the depreciation of public debt bonds
As a final attempt to recover depositor’s confidence, the government passed a new Act that
guaranteed the “intangibility” of all bank deposits. That is, depositors received the formal
guarantee that they could freely dispose of their funds, which could neither be frozen nor changed
in assets that could be denominated in other currencies, yield different interest rates or have
different maturities.
Investor’s confidence was not met by just passing more legal commitments. The combination
of the initial Cavallo’s hints of heterodoxy and his later orthodox adjustments brought the worst of
both worlds. The pro-competitive measures were not effective in recovering the economic activity
since they did not address the central problem of the lack of demand, but they hindered the tax
collection and introduced a doubt in the continuity of convertibility. On the other hand, the cut of
fiscal expenditure weakened further the internal demand and, as it deepened depression, did not
reestablished any kind of confidence.
As a result, in November, depositors resumed their run from the banking system and
international reserves continued to melt (figures 5 and 7). Once again, no automatic adjustment was
at sight. The foreign banks that were engaged in delivering a contingent credit to the Central Bank
when a loss of reserves occurred, and that had punctually received the corresponding commitment
fees, found pretexts for eluding their obligation. And the local subsidiaries of international banks
did not receive from their central houses the amounts of dollars needed to return the deposits. The
particular “lender of last resort” that each of these banks were thought to have was not there when
it was needed. Private banks, both local and foreign-owned, asked to the government exceptional
measures to stop the deposit drain.
On December 3rd, Cavallo announced that depositors could no longer retire their money
from the banking system, while they still could use them for making payments with credit cards and
checks: the so-called corralito. The impossibility of withdrawing funds from the banking system
meant a severe blow to informal economy and a supplementary hampering to economic activity.
The convertibility system, already weakened by the formal end of the rate 1 peso = 1 US dollar (by
the introduction of the euro in the definition of the exchange rate) and by the emission of a variety
of local currencies without any backing of international reserves, came in fact to an end: people
could no longer freely change pesos to dollars at a fixed rate, simply because they could not
dispose of their money. Should they be allowed, there would not be enough dollars in the Central
Bank nor in the commercial banks for the conversion to be realized. This desperate step ruined the
public trust that could still exist in the banking sector and in the convertibility regime. Cavallo’s bet
that he could reverse adverse expectations just by throwing his reputation and skills in the balance
proved vain. He apparently gave too much importance to psychological factors, in the sense that
much of his measures were designed to strike investors’ mind rather than to improve
macroeconomic variables. In the end, after the massive demonstrations that provoked his dismissal
and forced the President De la Rúa to resign, he still refused to admit any mistake in his economic
diagnosis or policies, and insisted on a psychological explanation of facts: “when deprived of
money, people go mad”. 17
                                                     
17 See Clarín, “Ultimo Momento”, December 24th 2001.
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Figure 7
CENTRAL BANK INTERNATIONAL
RESERVES AND MONETARY BASE, JANUARY-DECEMBER 2001
(Millions of pesos)
Source:  On the basis of Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, Boletín Estadístico, several issues.
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V. Summary and conclusions
The experiences of Latin American countries with fixed
exchange rate regimes have been, for the most part, successful in
cutting inflations rates down, but have not been able to provide a
stable path for economic growth. These experiences can be stylised in
three different phases. The first one is dominated by a “virtuous
circle” between capital inflows, domestic credit booms, consumption
expansion, significant growth rates and low inflation, together with an
increasing external deficit. In a second phase, the virtuous circle ends,
mainly due to the misalignment of the real exchange and to trade and
current account deficits; this phase shows a significant slowdown in
economic growth. It culminates in a third phase, in which crisis strikes
and the economy has to go into, usually, very painful adjustment
process.
This paper argues that apart from the specificities of hard peg
regimes, Argentina’s convertibility experience can be also described
under these three phases. Phase one from 1991 to end of 1994. Phase
two roughly from 1995 to 1999, followed by a third phase, which
culminates in a financial crisis and the collapse of the regime in 2001.
Argentina’s present crisis cannot be understood simply as the outcome
of a drastic reduction in the availability of international capital flows,
but as the result of a long process of imbalance accumulation. Of
course, the sudden stop in the capital inflows is a key issue in
triggering the current crisis. However the intensity of the crisis, and
the fragility of the economy are not independent of the convertibility
regime and the disequilibria it produced.
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In this context, today’s economic crisis does not only respond to a change of mood in
international investors but mainly to the economic policy applied during the nineties. Convertibility
generated a dramatic change in relative prices of tradable and non-tradable causing serious
problems in the international competitiveness of the economy. Also, currency and maturity
mismatches left the productive, the fiscal, as well the financial sectors, in a very fragile situation
and highly vulnerable and dependent to capital inflows.
The trade deficits, the increasing foreign exchange requirement to keep honouring foreign
debt and the banking system exposure to currency mismatches negatively affected, in spite of the
convertibility, the exchange and country risks, and hence capital inflows. Even though
psychological factors are very important in expectation formation, economic variables play an
equal or more important role not only in shaping expectations but also in defining economic
performance and the intensity of the crisis.
The convertibility system was very successful as an anti-inflationary program. However
price stability is not a synonym of economic stability. Argentina shows that it is not possible to
sustain in the long run a hard peg regime together with long lasting fiscal or current account
deficits; either fiscal or current account equilibrium have to be achieved, which as it was seen is not
an obvious outcome of hard peg regimes. In Argentina, this simultaneous equilibrium was not
attained: when the economy grew, it produced an increase of imports and a trade deficit; when it
did not grow, there was a fall in tax revenues, which led to a fiscal deficit. Increasingly since the
Mexican crisis, the way to elude this contradiction was the increasing in public external debt. In
this sense contrary to what was suggested, the convertibility system stimulated public indebtedness
instead of forcing a move towards fiscal discipline.
The automatic adjustment mechanisms of the external sector and of domestic expenditure
that were supposedly embodied in the convertibility system did not work as expected. After the
Mexican crisis, the rapid losses in international reserves, experienced by the Central Bank, did not
materialize in an equivalent contraction of the monetary base. At the same time, a drop of bank
deposits was not accompanied by an equivalent reduction of bank loans. As the only way to avoid a
deep banking crisis, the Central Bank was forced to act as a lender of last resort. In 2001, the loss
of international reserves could only be stopped with the freezing of deposits inside the banking
system. Thus, the convertibility system proved to be vulnerable to a massive run against deposits.
In fact, hard pegs have proven to push the economy towards increasing vulnerabilities to financial
shocks and showed no instruments at all to face real shocks. Adopting dollarisation would have not
been an answer to the insolvency problem, and would have probably deepened the crisis.
Finally, the question mark that appears in the title of this article brings a word of caution
regarding the Ecuadorian case. Today, there are some indications that the recovery phase is getting
to an end, and it is not clear that the economy will continue to grow, and if so, at what rates. In any
case, economic authorities should be very careful in avoiding the phases here described.
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